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Abstract
The introduction and widespread use of credit cards increases trading effi-
ciency but, by also increasing the velocity of money, it causes inflation, in the
absence of monetary intervention.
If the monetary authority attempts to restore pre-credit card price levels
by reducing the money supply, it might have to sacrifice the efficiency gains.
When there is default on credit cards, there is even more inflation, and
less efficiency gains. The monetary authority might then have to accept less
than pre-credit card efficiency in order to restore pre-credit card price levels,
or else it will have to accept inflation if it is unwilling to cut efficiency below
pre-credit card levels. This could be a source of stagflation.
Key Words: Credit cards, outside money, inside money, central bank, in-
flation, stagflation
JEL Classification: D50, D51, D53, D61, E40, E50, E51, E52, E58
We argue that the introduction and widespread use of credit cards increases trad-
ing efficiency but must cause an increase in price levels, other things being equal.
Government monetary intervention sufficient to stop these price increases might undo
much of the efficiency gains that credit cards bring. Things are worse if there is de-
fault on credit cards: the price increases are greater, and the monetary authority
might have to engineer even more reductions in trading efficiency to bring back the
old price levels.
In modern economies, more and more transactions take place via credit cards.
They are perhaps the single most visible and talked about economic innovation in
the last 40 years. Yet credit cards have not been extensively studied by general equi-
librium theorists or monetary theorists, presumably because it has been thought that
the effects of credit cards are negligible, or easily managed by monetary interven-
tions. After all, credit cards only postpone the need for money, so one might wonder
∗Both authors have benefited greatly from many years of collaboration and conversation on the
theory of money with Martin Shubik. It is a pleasure to dedicate this paper to him. We would also
like to thank William Brainard and Michael Woodford for helpful and insightful critiques of our
model.
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whether they have any effect. An older macroeconomic literature in the 1950s and
60s did raise these issues about "near monies", but this was before the advent of
credit cards, in an intellectual era of reduced form models in which it would have
been impossible to directly analyze credit cards anyway.1
We introduce a one-period general equilibrium model in which all agents have easy
access to bank loans and to credit cards. They choose whether to buy goods with
cash or credit cards, and prices adjust in order to clear all markets. No assumptions
are needed on the number of commodities or the form of the utilities (beyond the
usual general equilibrium hypotheses of continuity and concavity). We show in a
series of theorems that credit cards must have a profound inflationary effect on price
levels, and that monetary interventions to prevent price increases can be problematic.
We do not deal with the transition from the regime without credit cards to the new
regime with credit cards, preferring to keep the analysis as simple as possible by
restricting ourselves in this paper to the comparative statics of a one-period model.
In a multi-period equilibrium we would expect to see several periods of rapid inflation
after credit cards are introduced, tapering off only when prices settle down at much
higher levels; after the inflationary transition, credit cards would continue to enable
efficient trade, but would no longer contribute to inflation.
The surge in price levels in the United States in the 1970s and early 1980s coincided
with the introduction of credit cards. Though we do not make an empirical connection
between credit cards and the stagflation in the 1970s and early 80s, our model provides
a theoretical possibility of a causal connection. Many countries have introduced credit
cards at different times over the past 30 years, with differing levels of default. In future
work we hope to take advantage of this data to provide some empirical evidence for
the theoretical conclusions we derive here.
In order to bring out the inflationary effect of credit cards in the starkest manner,
our model makes the extreme assumption that all agents have the same easy access to
bank loans and credit cards. Under this assumption credit cards double the velocity
of money, because the cash proceeds from the sale of goods can be used again to
defray the debt on credit card purchases. The same dollar in effect can be used by
one agent for purchases in the cash-commodity market and simultaneously by another
for purchases in the credit card-commodity market. This creates a massive inflation,
on the order of 100%.
In reality, the inflationary effect of credit cards may be less than in our stark
model. Many agents who did not have acces to bank loans can borrow today via
credit cards. Such agents could easily be incorporated into our model, as we illustrate
via an example in Section 4.2.2 In their presence, credit cards create big efficiency
gains in trade, and therefore, with the same amount of money chasing more goods, the
inflationary impact of credit cards is diminished. In reality, there are also intermediate
1See for example Gurley and Shaw [1960], Brainard and Tobin [1963], Tobin [1963], and Brainard
[1964].
2See also the section on limited market participation in Dubey-Geanakoplos [2003b].
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producer goods that are not purchasable via credit cards. They too could easily be
incorporated into our model.3 They would also have the effect of reducing the impact
of credit cards on inflation, since credit cards do not enable money to do double work
for agents whose trading is focused on these intermediate goods.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we recall the one-period monetary
economy that we ourselves introduced (Dubey-Geanakoplos (1992), (2003a)).4 We
could probably have studied credit cards in other monetary models, but ours appears
to be the simplest.5 Our model embodies the distinction Gurley and Shaw empha-
sized between inside and outside money; this distinction is crucial to the existence
of a positive value of money in a one-period economy. Theorem 1 reprises our old
observation that monetary equilibrium does exist if there are enough gains to trade
available from the initial endowment. The model also displays in rudimentary form
the trade-off the monetary authority faces between efficiency and inflation.6
Credit cards are introduced in Section 2, and for simplicity, we first examine the
idealized situation where default does not occur. Consumers choose whether to buy
goods with cash or credit cards, raising the question whether money can survive.
Indeed many commentators refer to the coming “cashless” economy in which the
supply of inside and outside money (i.e., cash) will be irrelevant. It is tempting to
think that if credit cards became available to all households for the purchase of all
commodities, and if there were no credit limits, then virtually all transactions would
be conducted via credit cards, eventually eliminating the use of money altogether.
Who would borrow money at positive interest to buy with cash when he could pay by
credit card without interest? The puzzle is resolved in our one-period model because
credit card prices are higher than cash prices, or in other words, cash purchases are
made at a discount. (In a multi-period model, equality of cash and credit card prices
could be maintained, provided there are consumers who pay interest on their credit
card debt). We are able to show quite generally in Theorem 2 that money remains
viable with credit cards (though less valuable), i.e. that an equilibrium exists in which
money has positive (albeit diminished) value.
Theorem 2 also shows that credit cards improve trading efficiency. This is not
because we suppose that going to the bank to get cash wears down shoe leather.
3See again Dubey-Geanakoplos [2003b].
4Shubik-Wilson (1973) introduced a central bank loaning inside money, but they did not have
individual endowments of outside money. Without default, the bank interest rate must then always
be zero and trade must be efficient. In contrast we allow for individual endowments of money, which
leads to a positive bank interest rate and inefficient trade even when there is no default.
5The famous Lucas-Stokey [1987] model is a natural candidate. But that model has an infinite
number of periods, making calculations unwieldy. Incidentally, Lucas and Stokey do include credit
goods (goods that can be bought without cash in advance). But these goods cannot be bought with
cash. The choice of whether to buy with cash or credit cards, and how the market gives incentives
for each, is central to our model. There is also no default on credit in the Lucas and Stokey model.
6Inflation normally means the rate of increase of price levels over time. This cannot be modeled
in our one-period economy. So by inflation we mean the comparative statics exercise in which price
levels rise.
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In fact, bank transactions nowadays are done sitting at the computer, or with debit
cards, and this is reflected in our model by postulating costless transactions. The real
source of the efficiency gains is not saving shoe leather, but that credit cards increase
the velocity of money. Credit cards are much more than pieces of plastic: they are
backed by a sophisticated and expensive computer network that settles accounts by
transferring money obtained from cash sales to defray credit card purchases. This
enables money to do double work.7
Credit card purchases do crowd out some cash transactions, but they do not
threaten the viability of money; indeed they enhance it. By improving the efficiency
of transactions, credit cards paradoxically create circumstances or parameter values
for which money could not have any positive value on its own, but does after credit
cards are added.
However, the threat to money from credit cards is not without basis. What is
crucial is how credit cards are settled. With unrestricted netting and no credit limits,
money would cease to have value. But in the natural case of Theorem 2, corresponding
roughly to the situation faced by the typical consumer today, credit card debts and
receipts are not “netted.” A consumer who gets his credit card bill must find the cash
to pay, perhaps by writing a check on his bank account or paying with a debit card.8
He cannot point out that as a merchant he has sold goods to customers charged on
their credit cards, who owe him as much money as he himself owes. Without netting,
credit cards do not alleviate the need for money, they only postpone it. In a postscript
in Section 6.9 we do allow for netting on credit cards, and show that there are still
circumstances in which money can have value. Theorem 8 asserts that if there are
cash-only commodities not accessible to credit cards, or households with credit limits,
then money will have value regardless of netting, provided there are suitable gains to
trade.
In Section 3 we examine the inflation caused by credit cards, when the monetary
authority remains passive, and the potential stagflation when it tries to intervene.
Within the confines of our simple model these effects are dramatic. In Theorem 3 we
prove that when there is no default or credit limits in a one-period economy, aggregate
cash expenditures necessarily equal aggregate credit card expenditures. Theorem 4
shows that the introduction of credit cards creates a new equilibrium in which the
price level is higher, on the order of about 100%. Furthermore, their introduction
has the identical effect on cash prices and commodity allocations as the infusion of
vastly more inside money (almost double when the outside money is small).
7Though we do not pursue this in our model, one could further imagine two credit cards, which
were settled sequentially, which would enable money to do triple work, creating yet more inflation
and trading efficiency.
8In the model we shall shortly describe, we allow for cash and for credit cards, but not for
example for debit cards or checking accounts. These extra instruments are similar to cash; indeed
their differences from cash can only be rigorously modeled in a multiperiod setting. In any case,
with or without them, the issues connected with credit card purchases are quite similar, so we treat
those issues in the simplest setting, without debit cards or checking accounts.
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Amonetary authority, alarmed by the inflation, might try to undo it by tightening
the money supply. We show in Theorem 5 that the authority can indeed cut the
money supply to reproduce the pre-credit card equilibrium cash prices. But at the
same time it will have to reduce trade to the pre-credit card equilibrium levels. This
means giving up all the efficiency gains created by the credit cards.
Furthermore, this tightening does not completely undo the inflation because credit
cards and money are not perfect substitutes: if the cash prices are brought back to
their pre-credit card levels, trade will be back to where it was before, but the credit
card prices will have to be slightly higher. Thus the average (credit card and cash)
price would not be restored. This is a touch of stagflation.
In Section 4 we work out an example illustrating Theorems 1-5. We also consider
an example that allows for agents who do not have access to bank loans, and for whom
credit cards suddenly open up hitherto unavailable opportunities for trading. If the
fraction of such people is not too large, the same sort of inflation and efficiency gains
obtain. But as this fraction rises, the inflationary effect of credit cards is reduced.
In Section 5 we introduce credit card default, which is so prevalent in the real
economy, via a simple example with exogenously fixed default. We imagine a world
of reliable Dr. Jekylls who always keep their credit card promises and unreliable Mr.
Hydes who never do. Through credit card default the Hydes are able to spend more
money than they have. Of course in equilibrium the default rate on credit cards
reflects the pooled behavior of the Jekylls and Hydes, and is rationally anticipated.
We show that default accentuates the inflationary impact of credit cards and
reduces their efficiency impact. Though the Hydes generate artificial extra demand,
their presence lowers the volume of trade, leaving it between the pre-credit card level
and the level with credit cards that don’t default. With enough Hydes, utility of
the honest Jekylls is even lower than it was in the pre-credit card equilibrium. The
latter is somewhat surprising. Were the Jeckylls able to jointly commit not to trade
via credit cards, they could all steer clear of the Hydes and all be better off. But
once all the other Jekylls are trading with credit cards, the resulting inflation has
already robbed each Jekyll of some of the purchasing power of his cash endowment.
When credit cards do not default, the efficiency gains in trade overcome this loss of
purchasing power. But with default, the wedge between buying and selling prices is
increased, and trading efficiency is diminished.
If the monetary authority, alarmed by the enormous inflation caused by credit
cards and default, tries to correct the situation by reducing the money supply, the
volume of trade will fall, as will utilities. At the point where price levels are restored
all the way back to their pre-credit card levels, the volume of trade will be lower than
its pre-credit card level, and the utilities of the Jekylls will be worse. The monetary
authority might very well stop short of reducing money supply so far. If it stops
when the volume of trade is at pre-credit card levels, prices would be left above their
their pre-credit card levels; in our example, 24% higher. Most likely, the monetary
authority will stop somewhere in between, creating a new equilibrium with higher
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prices, less volume of trade, and lower utilities. Thus with default on credit cards we
get a touch more stagflation.
In our examples we have taken the interest rate to be the round number of 10%.
Since our one-period model really only captures a transactions interest, a more re-
alistic number might be .5%. Then even without credit cards, trades will be nearly
Walrasian, so the efficiency gains once credit cards are introduced will be very small.
But the inflation will still be around 100%. And it will still be the case that if the
monetary authority is determined not to reduce trade below the pre-credit card level,
then it will have to accept a significant inflation, such as 20%, as we show in another
example in Section 6. However, in this case, the monetary authority can restore the
pre-credit card price levels with only a small reduction in trade below pre-credit card
levels.
In Section 6 we introduce a general model of endogenous default with nominal
penalties. Default would seem to be a disequilibrium phenomenon, but we show that
there is no problem reconciling it with equilibrium. We allow households to choose
to default on their credit card payments. Those who do must pay a penalty. If the
penalty is very high, nobody will default. But for intermediate default penalties,
some households will default and credit card receipts will correspondingly decline.
Credit card prices will respond by rising relative to cash prices, reflecting a default
premium. Those who keep their credit card promises effectively pay for those who
default. As the penalty falls, there will come a catastrophic point beyond which
credit cards will be abandoned and the economy will revert to exclusively using cash.
Theorem 6 guarantees that whatever the level of credit card default penalties, credit
card equilibrium will nonetheless exist (with or without the use of credit cards), under
the same conditions as in Theorem 1.
In Section 6 we show that the various phenomena exhibited in our example of
Section 5 continue to hold in the general model with endogenous default. We also
briefly explore the existence of monetary equilibrium when netting is permitted on
credit cards. All proofs are relegated to Section 7.
Our model implicitly presumes that the seigniorage profit of the central bank is
equal to the exogenous stock of outside money. Reductions in the stock of inside bank
money therefore monotonically increase the equilibrium interest rate. One might
instead take the view that as the monetary authority reduced the stock of bank
money, it could hold the interest rate fixed, losing seigniorage profit, but making up
for it by lump sum taxes payable in cash. That would enable the monetary authority
to undo the inflationary impact of credit cards without sacrificing their efficiency
gains. However, if taxes were not lump sum, but levied on trade, then the monetary
authority would not have such an easy time of it, and the problem of undoing the
inflationary impact of credit cards would persist.
In this paper we confine ourselves to a single period setting. In forthcoming work
(Geanakoplos-Dubey (2009)) we examine a multi-period model, and we show that
financial innovations such as credit cards have a much bigger effect. In a one-period
6
model households will not hold idle money, but in a multi-period world without
credit cards, agents do hold idle cash. The introduction of credit cards then not only
increases the velocity of the spent money, but puts the idle money to work as well,
thus leading to still higher prices.
Furthermore, a naive monetary authority, that tries to hold prices at their pre-
credit card levels by increasing interest rates, will disproportionately hurt long-run
producers who do not benefit from the credit cards but do suffer from the higher
interest rates. The overreaction of the monetary authority could substantially cut
production below pre-credit card levels, possibly triggering significant stagflation.
A dynamic model also permits us to study the inflationary transition from a cash
economy to a credit card economy. One possibility is that as the use of credit cards
gradually spreads throughout the population, most of the inflation comes at the
beginning, engendered sheerly by the rational anticipation of the full spread of credit
cards.
1 The Pure Monetary Economy
Before introducing credit cards in Section 2, we recall the model fromDubey-Geanakoplos
(1992, 2003a) with money as the sole medium of exchange.
1.1 The Underlying Economy
We consider a standard pure exchange general equilibrium economy which lasts just
one time period and has only private goods (commodities) L = {1, ..., L}. The agents
in the economy are households H = {1, ...,H}. Each h ∈ H has an endowment
of commodities eh ∈ RL+ and a utility of consumption uh : RL+ → R. We assume:
(a) eh 6= 0 for all h ∈ H, i.e., every household has at least some endowment (e.g.,
his own labor); (b)
P
h∈H e
h À 0, i.e., every named commodity is present in the
aggregate; (c) uh is continuous, concave, and strictly increasing in each9 variable, for
all h ∈ H. The underlying economy, which constitutes the real sector of our model,
is denoted E ≡ (uh, eh)h∈H .
1.2 Money and Bank Loans
Money is stipulated to be the sole medium of exchange, until credit cards are intro-
duced. It is fiat and gives no direct utility of consumption to the households; they
value money only insofar as it enables them to acquire commodities for consumption.
Money enters the economy in two ways: as private endowment mh ≥ 0 of house-
hold h ∈ H and as a stockM > 0 at a bank. Apart from households, the bank is the
9Strict monotonicity is assumed for ease of presentation, and can be weakened (see Dubey-
Geanakoplos [2003a]).
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only other agent in our model, but it has a passive role. It stands ready to lendM to
households at an interest rate that is determined endogenously in equilibrium. Both




h > 0 constitutes the stock of outside money, which households
own free and clear of debt, at the start of the economy; while the bank stock M
is inside money and is always accompanied by debt when it comes into households’
hands. We denote the monetary economy by (E ,m,M) ≡ ((uh, eh,mh)h∈H ,M); and
its private sector by (E ,m) ≡ (uh, eh,mh)h∈H .
The period is divided into three time intervals. In the first interval, households
borrow money from the bank. In the second interval, they exchange commodities for
money and vice versa. In the third interval, they repay bank loans with money and
consume. Default is not permitted on bank loans. (It will be permitted on credit
card loans in Section 6).
The interest rate r and the commodity prices p are regarded as fixed by the
households before they trade, although as is usual in general equilibrium, it is their
trades which determine these prices. In the first interval households sell IOU notes
or bonds promising $1 to the bank in exchange for cash of 1/(1 + r) dollars. In
the second interval all commodity markets meet simultaneously. There is a cash-in-
advance constraint which requires households to pay money to purchase commodities
at prices p at the different markets. It is only in the third interval, after these markets
close, that revenue from the sales of commodities comes into households’ hands, by
which time it is too late to use this revenue for purchases. Those households who
find their endowment mh of money insufficient will need to borrow money from the
bank to finance purchases, and will defray the loan out of their sales revenue.
1.3 Prices
We denote money by m (without confusing it with the vector m ≡ (m1, ...,mH)
of household endowments). Let p m > 0 denote the price of commodity ∈ L in
terms of money, and let r ≥ 0 denote the interest rate on the bank loan. The vector
(p, r) ∈ RL++ ×R+ will be referred to as “market prices.”
1.4 The Budget Set of a Household
Since money is the sole medium of exchange, the vector qh of market actions of
household h has 2L+1 components (where ∈ L and n denotes an IOU or bond sold
to the bank):
qhnm ≡ quantity of bonds sold by h to the bank for money
qhm ≡ money spent by h to purchase
qhm ≡ quantity of sold by h for money
(It is evident, on account of there being just one period, that no household would
improve its consumption by depositing money at the bank to earn interest. So, we
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suppress deposits, i.e., the purchase of bonds qhmn.)
We consider the case of a perfectly competitive household sector. Each h ∈ H
regards market prices (p, r) ∈ RL++ × R+ as fixed (uninfluenced by its own actions).
The budget set Bh(p, r) consists of all market actions and consumptions (qh, xh) ∈
R2L+1+ × RL+ that satisfy the budget constraints (1), (2), (3 ), (4 ), (5), and (6 ), for
all ∈ L. The residual variables x̃h = x̃h(qh, p) and m̃h = m̃h(qh, r) are determined







qhm ≤ mh + m̃h (2)












xh ≤ (∆3 ) + x̃h. (6 )
Here ∆(α) is the difference between the right and left sides of inequality (α). The
interpretation is clear: (1) says that household h borrows m̃h dollars by promising
to pay qhnm = (1 + r)m̃
h dollars after commodity trade; (2) says that total money
spent on purchases cannot exceed the money on hand, i.e., money endowed plus
money borrowed; (3 ) says that no household can sell more of any commodity than
it is endowed with; (4 ) says that households purchase commodities with money at
market prices p; (5) says that we are not permitting default, i.e., every household
must fully deliver on its bonds; (6 ) says that the consumption vector cannot exceed
what a household winds up with after trade.
1.5 Monetary Equilibrium
A vector of prices and household actions
h(p, r), (qh, xh)h∈Hi
is amonetary equilibrium (ME) of (E ,m,M) if all households optimize in their budget
sets, i.e.,
(a) (qh, xh) ∈ Bh(p, r)
(b) uh(xh) ≥ uh(xh) for all (qh, xh) ∈ Bh(p, r); (7)
9












Notice that since the components of p at any ME must be finite by definition, money
will have positive value at an ME.
It is worth noting that in a monetary equilibrium, the total stock of money and
commodities held in the hands of the bank and the households is conserved in all
three time intervals into which the period is divided. In the beginning of the first
interval the bank holds M and households hold m̄ of money. At the end of the first
interval and in the beginning of the second interval households hold all ofM+m̄. The
money is rearranged among the households in the second interval, so all of M + m̄
is still in their hands at the end of the second interval and at the beginning of the
third interval. At the end of the third interval, the bank is left holding all of M + m̄.
The reason for the latter is that no household will be left with unowed cash after
repaying the bank, otherwise he should have borrowed and spent more money earlier
to purchase commodities, or else curtailed his sale of commodities, improving his
utility. Thus all of M + m̄ does end up with the bank. But that would not happen
unless at least M + m̄ is owed to the bank. Since default is not permitted on bank
loans, no more could be owed to the bank. Thus (1+ r)M =M + m̄ at any ME, i.e.,
r = m̄/M .
1.6 Gains to Trade
Money is needed only for trading commodities. It follows that the value of money
in the economy must depend entirely on the level of households’ a priori motivation
to trade commodities with each other. What is needed is an intrinsic “gains-to-
trade" hypothesis. We developed a measure of gains-to-trade in Dubey-Geanakoplos
[1992,2003], and showed that, whenever they are strong enough from the initial en-
dowment, monetary equilibrium exists, i.e. money has value.
The idea is to check whether a central planner with a "γ-handicap" can nev-
ertheless reallocate goods to make everybody better off. After the planner collects
commodities from the agents, he must throw away a fraction γ/(1+ γ) of everything
collected and then redistribute what remains.
To make this precise, let τh ∈ RL be a trade vector of h (with positive components
representing purchases and negative components representing sales). For a scalar
γ > −1, define
τh(γ) = min{τh, τh/(1 + γ)}
Note τh(γ) = τh if τh < 0, τh(γ) = τh/(1 + γ) if τh > 0. Thus τh(γ) entails a
diminution of purchases in τh by the fraction γ/(1 + γ).
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We say that there are gains-to-γ-diminished-trade from x ≡ (xh)h∈H ∈ (RL+)H if





(b) xh + τh ∈ RL+ for all h ∈ H
(c) uh(xh + τh(γ)) > uh(xh) for all10 h ∈ H.
We define γ(x) as the least upper bound of all handicaps that permit Pareto improve-
ment.
Definition: The gains-to-trade from x are given by
γ(x) = sup{γ : there are gains-to-γ-diminished-trade from x}.
The number γ(x) can be viewed as a local measure of the departure from Pareto
optimality. It represents how easy it is to make a small Pareto improvement starting
from x. If x is Pareto optimal, then γ(x) = 0; otherwise γ(x) > 0. With two agents
and two goods, [1 + γ(x)]2 is the ratio of the agents’ marginal rates of substitution
for the two goods.
We quote the following result from Dubey-Geanakoplos (2003a).
Theorem 1 Consider a monetary economy (E ,m,M) in which γ(e) > m̄/M . Then
a monetary equilibrium exists. At any monetary equilibrium (p, r, (qh, xh)h∈H), the







M + m̄. If the utilities (uh)h∈H are smooth, then the unexploited gains to trade from
the equilibrium allocation γ((xh)h∈H) = m̄/M .
Moreover, for generic smooth utilities, endowments, and money stocks, the econ-
omy ((uh, eh,mh)h∈H ,M) has finitely many monetary equilibria.
Note that if m̄ > 0, monetary equilibrium is never Pareto optimal for smooth
economies, since γ((xh)h∈H) > 0.
2 The Credit Card Economy
Let us now imagine that credit cards are introduced into our monetary economy.
Households can buy commodities directly with the credit cards, without having to
borrow any money in advance. Of course the seller then gets a promise, and not cash,
for his good. The simplest timing is to suppose that credit card purchases are made
simultaneously with cash purchases, but that credit card debts must be repaid just
before bank loans come due.
Denote by c the promise of one unit of money via the credit card. For ∈ L, let
p c ≡ credit card price of ≡ price of in terms of c
10Since utilities are strictly monotonic, this is equivalent to requiring that some household is
strictly better off and none are worse off.
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Note that the cash price p m of a commodity need not be the same as its credit
card price p c. By selling for cash, one gets the money sooner. So it might well be
that p m < p c. (In practice goods can often be purchased at a discount with cash.)
Thus market prices are now given by a longer vector (p, r) ≡ ((p m) ∈L, (p c) ∈L, r)
with 2L+ 1 components.
We denote the credit card economy by (Ec,m,M).
The vector qh of market actions of household h now has11 2L+2L+1 components,
with
qhαβ ≡ quantity of α sent by h to the market αβ
where the markets are nm (the bank loan market), ( c) ∈L (the credit card-commodity
markets), ( m) ∈L (the cash-commodity markets).
2.1 Credit Card Budget Set







qhm ≤ mh + m̃h (2∗)
qhc + q
h


























xh ≤ ∆(3 ∗) + x̃h(c) + x̃h(m) (7∗ )
The budget set Bhc (p, r) of household h consists of all (q
h, xh) that satisfy constraints
(1∗) to (7∗). (1∗) and (2∗) are as in the monetary economy. (3∗ ) says that household
h sells good separately against cash and credit cards, but cannot sell in total more
than it has. (4∗ ) says that household h buys good separately with cash and credit
cards. (5∗) requires that credit card debts be paid in full with money, before cash
receipts from credit card sales become available, and before bank loans come due.
(6∗) says that after receiving all the money from sales against credit cards, there is
enough money to pay off all bank loans. (7∗ ) constrains household h to consume no
more of commodity than it has after trade.
11Since bank deposits are returned after clearing debts on the credit card, once again no household
will want to deposit money at the bank, and we suppress deposits.
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The critical thing to notice is that the same dollar can be used to repay two
different debts: one household uses the dollar to pay his credit card debt, and the
recipient uses the same dollar to pay his bank loan.
Thus credit cards enable money to do extra work. This inevitably causes inflation,
as we shall see shortly. In a multiperiod model (see Geanakoplos-Dubey (2009)),
inflation is even higher because households drastically reduce their holdings of idle
cash, making money work still harder.
2.2 Credit Card Equilibrium
We say that hp, r, (qh, xh)h∈Hi is a credit card equilibrium of the economy (Ec,m,M)
if:
(a) (qh, xh) ∈ Bhc (p, r) (8∗)
(b) uh(xh) ≥ uh(xh) for all (qh, xh) ∈ Bhc (p, r); (7)


















qhc ∀ ∈ L (1)
i.e., all markets clear.
2.3 Existence and Efficiency of Credit Card Equilibrium
Theorem 2 Let (Ec,m,M) be a credit card economy and assume that γ(e) >q
1 + m̄
M
− 1. Then a credit card equilibrium exists. Moreover, if hp, r, (qh, xh)h∈Hi






for all ∈ L. Finally, if the utilities (uh)h∈H are smooth, then the unexploited gains













< 1 + m̄
M
, so that credit card equilibrium






1 + γ(e) < 1 + m̄
M
, even where monetary equilibrium might not. The introduction of
credit cards thus enhances the viability of money.
It is often said that credit cards will drive out money, and that we are headed
toward a cashless economy. Observe, however, that the reasons which make credit
card purchases more attractive than cash purchases to the buyer often make them
less attractive to the seller. Buyers prefer to pay later rather than earlier, and a credit
card purchase enables them to defer the transfer of cash. But for precisely this reason,
sellers prefer cash buyers. Similarly, as we shall see in Section 6, a buyer might prefer
to purchase by promise, retaining the option of defaulting if his circumstances do not
improve, and once again sellers prefer ready cash to promises that may be broken.
The presumption that credit cards must eventually drive out cash neglects half the
market, since it ignores the sellers.
The key is to recognize that cash and credit cards will coexist if cash prices are
lower than credit card prices.
Notice that in our model the introduction of credit cards does not affect the bank
rate of interest r = m̄/M . Nevertheless, since the gains to trade remaining at credit
card equilibrium are lower than the gains to trade remaining at monetary equilibrium,
credit cards lead to more efficient trade. This is because the "effective" rate of interest
paid in credit card equilibrium is
p
1 + m̄/M − 1, which is lower than the rate m̄/M
prevailing in pure monetary equilibrium.
In the pure monetary economy, households borrowed money from the bank to
purchase commodities and sold commodities for cash in order to defray the bank
loan. As a result, buyers who borrowed a dollar to spend on goods had to sell
goods worth (1 + r) dollars in order to repay the bank. The introduction of credit
cards enables households to reduce this wedge to
p
(1 + r) by engaging in either of
two equivalent trading strategies. From Theorem 2, credit card prices are preciselyp
(1 + r) higher than cash prices. Any household can purchase commodities, whose
cash prices are $1, by charging $
p
(1 + r) on a credit card and then selling goods for
cash worth $
p
(1 + r) to defray the credit card debt, indeed reducing the wedge top
(1 + r). Or else, he can borrow $1 from the bank, spend the cash on goods, while
simultaneously raising enough money to repay the bank by selling other commodities
against credit cards for $(1 + r). Since the credit card sales have cash value equal to
$(1 + r)/
p
(1 + r) = $
p
(1 + r), the wedge is again
p
(1 + r).
We shall call these two trading strategies buy-credit/sell-cash and buy-cash/sell-
credit, respectively. They are reflected in (i) and (ii) of Theorem 3 below.
2.4 Flow of Funds in Credit Card Equilibrium
Theorem 3 Let (Ec,m,M) be a credit card economy and assume that hp, r, (qh, xh)h∈Hi
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m. Similarly, (ii) individ-
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The proof of Theorem 3 also follows from the proof of Theorem 4.
Households sell commodities for cash (at prices lower than they could get by selling
against credit cards) only in order to defray their own credit card debt, incurrred in
the course of following the first trading strategy described above. This is the content
of (i) of Theorem 3.
Since all the sales revenue from the commodity-cash markets are used to redeem
credit card debts, households must repay their bank loans out of the sales revenue
from commodity-credit card markets. This explains (ii) of Theorem 3.
Since total cash receipts must equal total cash expenditures, and since in a one-
period model all cash is spent, both must equal (M + m̄). From (i) we conclude that
aggregate credit card debt is equal to (M + m̄). But credit card debt is another word
for credit card expenditures, hence we have
Corollary to Theorem 3: In any credit card equilibrium, total expenditures on
cash markets = total expenditures on credit card markets (albeit calculated at dif-












m = (M + m̄). Thus total
expenditures are 2(M + m̄).
The introduction of credit cards in our one-period model doubles expenditures,
independent of the interest rate or preferences of the agents. Since aggregate cash
expenditures are the same as aggregate credit card expenditures, but credit card
prices are uniformly higher than cash prices, it follows that more than half of all sales
are against cash. Credit card purchases indeed crowd out cash purchases, but never
more than half (in our one-period model).
3 Credit Cards and Inflation
The main effect of credit cards is to increase prices, i.e, they lower the value of money
even as they increase its viability. The following theorem shows that the introduction
of credit cards is tantamount to an infusion of a huge amount of bank money. As
was said, its proof, in conjunction with Theorem 1, also yields a constructive proof
of Theorem 2, as well as a proof of Theorem 3.
Theorem 4 Consider a credit card economy (Ec,m,M). Let (E ,m,M∗) be a pure





Then the equilibria of the two economies coincide in the following sense. For every
credit card equilibrium (p, r, (qh, xh)h∈H) of (Ec,m,M), there exists a pure mon-
etary equilibrium (p∗, r∗, (∗qh,∗ xh)h∈H) of (E ,m,M∗) with the same consumption
(∗xh)h∈H = (x
h)h∈H and the same cash prices (p∗m) ∈L = (p m) ∈L but a lower in-
terest rate (1 + r∗) =
√
1 + r. And vice versa.
Theorem 4 (in conjunction with Theorem 1) yields
Corollary 1 to Theorem 4 For generic smooth utilities, endowments, and money
stocks, the credit card economy (Ec,m,M) = ((uh, eh,mh)h∈H ,M) has finitely many
credit card equilibrium allocations and prices.
Note that determinacy is claimed here for equilibrium outcomes, not actions.
Typically it will be possible to shift some households’ trade from credit card pur-
chases/cash sales into cash purchases/credit card sales, while moving other households
in the reverse direction, without disturbing the equilibrium.
Corollary 2 to Theorem 4 Let E be a smooth underlying economy with a unique
Walrasian equilibrium. Let m be fixed. Then for all sufficiently large M, any pure
monetary equilibrium of (E ,m,M) has prices nearly proportional to Walrasian, and
trades nearly equal to Walrasian. When credit cards are added to (E ,m,M), prices
will nearly double, without much change in the trade.
According to the Corollary of Theorem 3, the introduction of credit cards literally
doubles the spending (via cash and credit cards) on traded goods. Part of the increase
in the money value of trade after credit cards are introduced is due to the increased
real trade permitted by more efficient exchange. But the great bulk of the increase
comes from higher prices. When m̄/M is very low, as in the scenario of Corollary 2 to
Theorem 4, monetary equilibrium trades are necessarily close to Walrasian (and, since
the wedge is lower, even closer after credit cards are introduced). Thus almost the
entire increase in spending is on exactly the same trades, causing prices to double.
Credit cards cause inflation. In a multi-period model the inflation would be even
higher, because people would spend their idle cash once they had credit cards to rely
on.
3.1 A Touch of Stagflation
We have seen that credit cards increase the efficiency of trade but cause massive
inflation. It is natural to imagine a monetary authority that would try to stem this
inflation by tightening the money supply and raising interest rates.
What is surprising is that in order to restore the old cash prices, it is necessary
to abandon all the gains to trade engendered by the credit cards. In fact, strictly
speaking, since the credit card prices are higher than the cash prices, it is actually
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necessary to reduce trade below the original pre-credit card levels in order that the
average cash/credit card price be no higher than before. Curiously, a financial inno-
vation (like credit cards) that creates the potential for more efficient trade might end
up reducing trade if the monetary authority is committed to preventing all inflation.
A conservative monetary authority might well compromise by tolerating a small
increase in average prices. But if the increase were small enough, there would neces-
sarily be a drop in efficiency. This is stagflation, though perhaps just a semblance.
Theorem 5 follows immediately from Theorem 4 (taking M∗ = M and M = M̂)
and Theorem 2.
Theorem 5 Consider a monetary economy (E ,m,M) with an equilibrium (p, r, (qh, xh)h∈H).
If credit cards are added to the economy, there is always a reduction in the bank money
supply to M̂ < M solving M = M̂ +
p
M̂2 + m̄M̂ such that the credit card econ-
omy (Ec,m, M̂) has an equilibrium (p̂, r̂, (q̂h, x̂h)h∈H), where consumption is what it
was before credit cards, (x̂h)h∈H = (xh)h∈H , and cash prices are restored to their
pre-credit card levels, p̂ m = p m, but credit card prices are higher than cash prices,
p̂ c = (
q
1 + (m̄/M̂))p̂ m > p m for all ∈ L. A further reduction in money sup-
ply to M̃ will lower average prices in the credit card equilibrium (p̃, r̃, (q̃h, x̃h)h∈H) to
their pre-credit card levels, but (assuming utilities are smooth), at the cost of leaving
more unexploited gains to trade than there were before credit cards were introduced
γ((x̃h)h∈H) > γ((x
h)h∈H).
In our forthcoming paper Geanakoplos-Dubey (2009) we show that this stagflation
phenomenon is greatly exacerbated in a multi-period world. But even in our one-
period setting, we shall see that we can get genuine stagflation, not just a semblance
of it, if there is default on credit cards. The reason is that the default can eliminate
most of the efficiency gains of credit cards, while at the same increasing the inflation
caused by credit cards. A monetary authority that tries to cut inflation will have to
reduce real trade.
4 Examples
4.1 Pure Monetary Equilibrium
Consider an exchange economy with two agents and two goods. Let the agents have
identical utilities
uh(x1, x2) = log x1 + log x2, h = 1, 2
Let
e1 = (3, 1)
e2 = (1, 3)
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In Walrasian equilibrium, we would have p = (λ, λ) for any λ > 0, and x1 = x2 =
(2, 2). As is well known, Walrasian economics ignores fiat money, and therefore cannot
pin down the price level ; nor does it make room for the nominal rate of interest r.
We first add inside money, then outside money, and finally credit cards to the
model.
Suppose M = 2 and m1 = m2 = 0. Then it is easy to see that one monetary
equilibrium goes like this: each agent borrows $1 from the bank at interest rate zero;
commodity prices are p1m = p2m = 1; agent h spends $1 buying one unit of commodity
−h 6= h, while simultaneously selling one unit of commodity h, for h = 1, 2; each h
takes the $1 he got from selling and uses it to repay his bank loan.
There is no equilibrium in which the rate of interest r > 0. For then the bank
would be owedM(1+r), but with onlyM dollars in existence, there would necessarily
be default on bank loans, which is not permitted. There are however many other
equilibria with r = 0 in which (p1m, p2m) = λ(1, 1) with 0 < λ ≤ 1. Each agent h
borrows $1 as before, sells one unit of good h, and spends $λ on the other good (good
−h). He simply hoards the other $(1− λ) returning it unspent, together with the $λ
obtained from selling one unit of h. Thus adding inside money M to the economy
only reproduces the Walrasian indeterminancy of equilibrium price levels, with an
upper bound on λ.
Monetary equilibrium becomes more interesting once we take m̄ ≡ m1 +m2 > 0.
Then we get a unique equilibrium and positive interest rate, provided the gains to
trade at the initial endowment e exceed m̄/M . Let us suppose that m1 = m2 > 0,
and that M > m̄/2 is arbitrary.12
The stock of inside bank money M , and the outside money (m1,m2), in conjunc-
tion with the real economy, will determine price levels and the rate of interest. In




By symmetry, we have x1 = (3− τ, 1+ τ), x2 = (1+ τ, 3− τ) for some 0 < τ ≤ 1.
Since there is only one period, agents will spend all their money. Hence, once again
by symmetry, we must have
pm = p1m = p2m =
M + m̄
2τ
Finally, in equilibrium we must have that the ratio of the marginal utilities of
consumption are equal to the ratio of prices, distorted by the interest rate wedge.
Agent 1 can borrow p2mε dollars more and buy ε units of good 2, but then he must
12The gains to trade at e can be immediately computed from the formula in Dubey-Geanakoplos
(2003)as
p
3/1 · 3/1 = 1+γ(e), so γ(e) = 2. Thus monetary equilibrium exists for all (m1+m2)/M =
m̄/M < 2, i.e., for M > m̄//2.
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sell (1+r)p2mε/p1m = (1+r)ε units of good 1 to raise the revenue to repay the bank.
Hence we must have:
3− τ
1 + τ
= 1 + r.













(M + m̄)(2M + m̄)
4M − 2m̄
As can be seen, the need for money to make transactions introduces an inefficiency
into the sytem. The efficient trade level is τ = 1, but in the monetary equilibrium
τ(M) is always less than 1. (Indeed forM < m̄/2 there are not enough gains to trade
at e to support any monetary equilibrium.)
As M increases (holding m̄ fixed) the nominal rate of interest charged by the
bank, r = m̄/M , decreases, and the level of trade τ(M)→ 1 as M →∞.
Unfortunately, asM increases, the price level pm(M) also increases. If the central
bank does not want to allow too high a price level, it will need to keep M low.
For example, if m̄ = 2 andM = 20, then r = (1+1)/20 = 10%, τ = 19/21 ≈ 0.90
and pm = 21(22)/38 ≈ 12.16. If we follow Theorem 4 and take m̄ = 2 and M =
20 +
p
202 + 2(20) = 40.98, then r ≈ 4.9%, τ ≈ .95, and pm ≈ 22.56. The increase
in efficiency from τ = .90 to τ = .95,engineered by an increase in the stock of bank
money M from 20 to 40.98, has been at the cost of almost a 90% inflation of prices.
The model thus incorporates a simple trade-off between efficiency and the price
level, which we shall use as a proxy for the very important trade-off the Federal
Reserve faces between employment (or output) and inflation. In a non-symmetric
economy, agents with relatively high cash endowmentsmh could be opposed to policy
that reduced interest rates and increased trading efficiency, because the higher prices
would diminish the value of their cash endowments.
4.2 Credit Card Equilibrium
Suppose credit cards are suddenly introduced. They improve the transactions tech-
nology in our model by enabling an extra period of cash flow between commodity
trade and bank repayment. This represents the overnight electronic transfer of credit
card accounts in the real world. Now the same paper money can do more work, and
inevitably price levels rise.
The transactions technology improvement will reduce the wedge between buying
and selling, and thus tend to improve welfare. On the other hand, the price level
increase will reduce the purchasing power of the each household’s stock of outside
money mh, which tends to reduce welfare. When there is no default on credit cards,
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the benefits from superior technology outweigh the costs of higher prices. But as
we shall see, when credit cards default, some of the benefits are frittered away, and
welfare tends to go down on account of the inflation.
To find money prices and credit card prices we must consider the sales each agent
makes of his abundant good against credit cards τc and of the same good against










(3− τm − τc)







The first equation comes from the fact that all the money M + m̄ is spent equally in
the two cash markets. The second equation says that cash receipts are used entirely
to pay off credit card debt. The third equation, which may also be written pc/pm =p
(1 + r), equates the two strategies of trading in a CCE. On the left hand side is
the quantity of good that must be sold on the credit card market in order to repay
the bank loan required to buy an incremental unit on the cash market. On the right
hand side is the quantity of good that must be sold on the cash market in order to
repay the debt incurred buying an incremental unit on the credit card market. Since
each agent is buying on both markets, these must be equal.
The fourth equation says that the wedge between buying with borrowed cash and
selling on credit cards (or vice versa), which is
p
(1 + r), as we just saw, must equal
the ratio of the marginal utility of buying and selling. The last equation holds as
before because there is no bank default.
Solving these equations for M = 20,m1 = m2 = 1, we see that trade is more
efficient, but the cash prices nearly double, and the credit card prices are even higher:
τm = 0.488
τc = 0.465
τ ∗ = 0.953 > .90
pm = 22.56 > 12.16
pc = 23.66
r = .1
The introduction of credit cards does not change the rate of interest at the bank.
But let us denote the "wedge" between buying and selling (or the "effective interest
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, so, 1+r∗ < (1+r∗)2 = 1+r, where r is the bank rate
of interest (both before, and after, the introduction of credit cards). For M = 20,
r = 10% and r∗ ≈ 4.9%.
The fourth equation may now be recast
3− τ ∗
1 + τ ∗




≈ 0.95 > 0.90 ≈ 2− r
2 + r
= τ
revealing that trade is more efficient because r∗ < r.
These trades and cash prices are exactly the same as were obtained without credit
cards in the pure monetary economy with inside money M = 40.98, as stated in
Theorem 4.
Now we verify that there are indeed corresponding credit card equilibrium actions.
Let each agent h borrow M/2 = $10 from the bank and spend $11 = $1 + $10 on
the cash market for good −h, and thus buying 11/pm ≈ 0.49 of good −h via cash.
Let h also spend $11 on the credit card market for good −h thus buying 11/pc ≈ 0.46
of good −h via the credit card. Finally, let each agent h sell 0.49 units of good h
against cash, and 0.46 units of good h against the credit card promise.13
Notice that all markets clear. Also, each agent h is able to repay his credit card
debt of $11 from the revenue he obtains from his cash sales. Furthermore, since each
agent h borrows $10 from the bank at interest rate 10%, he must repay $11 to the
bank. But this is precisely what he is paid for his sales against the credit card just
before he must go to the bank. The cash flows mirror what is stated in Theorem 3.
These choices are not only consistent, but also optimal for each household h. By
selling a unit of good h for cash at price pm and buying 1/(1 + r∗) units of good −h
via a credit card at price pc = (1+r∗)pm (repaying the credit card debt later with the
cash receipt) h faces a wedge of (1 + r∗) between buying and selling. This is also the
case if he borrows pm/(1 + r∗) from the bank at interest rate r, then uses the money
to purchase 1/(1 + r∗) units of good −h for cash at price pm, while simultaneously
selling one unit of good h against the credit card at price pc = (1 + r∗)pm. The
money obtained from the credit card sale will be just enough to repay the bank debt
(1 + r)pm/(1 + r
∗) = (1 + r∗)pm.




= (1 + r∗)
This is exactly how we derived the formula for trades τ ∗.
13Thinking of each type as many identical agents, we are here describing a type-symmetric equi-
librium in actions. But, as was said after Corollary 1 to Theorem 4, this can be recast in a more
realistic manner: some of each type could buy exclusively via credit cards and the rest exclusively
via cash without distrurbing the equilibrium allocation.
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As stated in Corollary 1 to Theorem 4, the introduction of credit cards has created
efficiency gains in trade, but at the cost of much higher price levels. Unfortunately,
the only way to reduce prices to their old levels is to give back all of the gains in
trade, and even a little more!
To get back to the old efficiency levels of trade means an effective interest rate of
r = 10% again. But as we just saw, in the presence of credit cards, that requires a
higher bank interest rate of
1 + r̂ = (1 + r)2 = 1.12 = 1.21








a drastic reduction in the money supply.
The price levels will then be
p̂m = 12.16 = pm
p̂c = (1 + r)p̂m = 13.38
While the cash prices are restored to their old levels, the credit card prices are 10%
higher. Since half the expenditures are by credit card, there is an overall inflation of
about 5%. The only way to get rid of this inflation is to reduce the bank supply even
more. But this will cut trading efficiency below the levels that prevailed prior to the
introduction of credit cards. This illustrates Theorem 5.
It is easy to imagine that the monetary authority might be reluctant to cut money
supply so far. It might well stop at a point where average trades are just a tad below
0.90 and prices are a tad above 12.16. This is a touch of stagflation.
Since the interest rate in our model corresponds to a transactions interest rate in
the real world, it is likely to be on the order of one week or one month’s interest.
That would be a small number, perhaps on the order of .5% instead of 10%. One can
easily see that in this case the efficiency gain from adding credit cards is quite small,
reducing the wedge by .25% instead of by 5% as in our example. But the inflation of
nearly 100% with credit cards holds no matter what the original interest. In fact it
is closer to exactly 100% the lower is r. This will become relevant when we introduce
default on credit cards.
4.3 Limited Access to Bank Loans
Now suppose in our example that 20% of both kinds of agents do not have access
to bank loans, but can use credit cards once they are introduced. We call them
constrained agents (CA’s). The rest of the agents (A’s) are as before. We shall find
that the pre-credit card economy is now quite inefficient and has higher prices than
before. The introduction of credit cards then causes a big efficiency gain and only a
50% increase in inflation instead of 90%.
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The credit card equilibrium prices and consumptions remain the same as before.
The CA’s simply purchase via credit card whatever they were purchasing via borrowed
cash, and they sell for cash whatever they were selling against the credit card. At the
same time the A’s reduce their credit card purchases and expand their cash purchases
to keep aggregate purchases the same after the deviation of the CA’s. Similarly the
A’s increase their sales on credit cards and decrease their sales against cash to keep
total sales in each market the same. The reader can check that this is an equilibrium.
The above procedure works as long as the percentage of CA’s is not too high.
The CA’s suffer greatly when there are no credit cards. For then the CA’s only
purchase with their initial endowment of cash, and can conduct no further trade. The
A’s borrow all the bank money and spend it along with their cash. The bank rate
of interest remains unchanged. The equilibrium is straightforward to compute, and
we find that the A’s each sell .913, which is slightly more than before, and buy .89,
which is slightly less than before. The reason they cannot afford to buy as much as
before is that the price rises to 15.05, since the same money is chasing fewer goods
(namely .8× .913 < .905). The real losers are the CA’s, who are constrained to buy
only .017.
Thus in the presence of constained agents, credit cards cause less inflation, 22.56/15.05 <
22.56/12.16, and bring more efficiency gains to everyone, but especially to the CA’s.
As the fraction of CA’s is increased, these effects become more pronounced.
5 Default and Stagflation
Credit card purchases conjure the possibility of default, so we take the opportunity
to introduce default into our models. Households will no longer be obliged to repay
their credit card debts; they may default.
If credit cards default, we must allow lenders to foresee this, and to charge a
"default premium", raising the credit card prices further above the cash prices. We
suppose for simplicity that a single credit card is usable across all goods. All credit
card cash payments are aggregated (across agents and commodities), and the ratio of
these payments to the aggregate credit card promises determines an average delivery
rate K for each merchant who sold commodities against credit cards. The shortfall
1−K is the default rate on credit cards, and from the merchant’s point of view can
be interpreted as a proportional fee on his credit card sales.
Deliveries made by “unreliable” households and “reliable” households are pooled.
As in real life, there is no practical device to easily separate them. Hence the reliable
credit card purchasers pay for the defaults of the unreliable purchasers via the higher
credit card prices.14
14One might even say that paying the default penalty allows the defaulters to steal from the reliable
purchasers. In the multiperiod world in which we live things are even worse. Credit card prices and
cash prices are generally the same, so credit card purchasers who pay on time are effectively getting
a month’s free interest. Reliable puchasers who pay late not only have to pay interest (sometimes as
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To introduce default into our model we will first extend our previous example by
thinking of two types of agents: reliable Dr. Jekylls whose characteristics are exactly
as before and who keep all their credit card promises, and unreliable Mr. Hydes who
always default. For simplicity, we suppose that Hyde always charges τh = .03 units of
each good on his credit card, eats the goods he thereby purchases, and then simply
defaults fully on his promises, and that he does nothing else. In effect the Hydes are
simply stealing τh = .03 from the Jekylls.
Our first conclusion will be that despite the sudden increase in demand from the
Hydes, the volume of trade is reduced by credit card default. As K falls the wedge
between credit card prices and cash prices rises, inhibiting trade. But even with
default on credit cards, the volume of trade can never be lower than it would be were
credit cards eliminated altogether.
Our second conclusion is that default accentuates the inflation brought on by
credit cards. This is so for two reasons. First, the bigger wedge caused by default
reduces total sales of commodities, as we already said. Second, somewhat strangely,
default raises the proportion of goods sold against credit cards. The two reasons work
together to raise pm because the same money M + m̄ is chasing fewer commodities
on the cash market.
Our third conclusion is that the utility to the Jekylls is lower than if there never
were any credit cards. This is quite surprising. The Jekylls could choose to transact
entirely in the cash markets, where there is no chance of default or scam. If they all did
so, then the previous cash-only equilibrium would be reached. But the convenience
of credit cards is irresistable if defaults are not too high. Once many Jekylls buy
and sell via credit cards, the volume of goods sold against cash is lowered, raising
the cash prices pm, as we just observed. That reduces the purchasing power of each
Jekyll’s endowment of money. Thus no Jekyll by himself can replicate his trade in
the cash-only equilibrium.
Thus credit cards can be bad for the economy when default occurs. They can
create a gigantic inflation and at the same time reduce the utility of honest Jekylls.
If the monetary authority, alarmed by this inflation, tries to correct the situation by
reducing the money supply M , it will make things worse. The volume of trade will
fall, as will utilities. At the point where price levels are restored to their pre-credit
card levels, the volume of trade will be lower, and the utilities of the Jekylls will
be much worse. The monetary authority might very well stop short of reducing M
so far, leaving a new equilibrium with higher prices, less volume of trade, and lower
utilities. Thus with default on credit cards, we get a touch more stagflation.
much as 18% per annum) in order to make up for the defaulters, but also to make up for the interest
free loans given to the automatic payers. These subtleties are necessarily absent in our one-period
model.
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5.1 An Example of More Stagflation with Constant Default
In doing comparative statics on an economy with credit card defaults, we need to be
explicit about how default will change as the economy grows poorer or richer. One
might guess, for instance, that as the economy grows poorer, agents will cheat more
out of desperation. In our first example we will keep things simple, supposing that
the amount of credit card fraud τh by the Hydes remains constant, even as we change
parameters such as the quantity of bank money M .
Suppose we are at an equilibrium in which the Jekylls are actually buying on the
credit card markets (as well as on cash markets). Letting τm and τc be the quantities
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Jekyll’s purchase on each credit card market is τc − τh since his purchase plus
Hyde’s purchase of τh must equal the total supply of τc. Since he delivers fully and
Hyde does not deliver at all, the rate of delivery on credit card promises is given by
the first equation. All the other equations are rationalized via Jekyll’s actions (as in
the CCE without default discussed in Section 4.2), noting that Jekyll’s purchase via
credit cards is τc−τh and on cash is τm, since Hydes don’t trade via cash; and further
noting that the effective wedge is now
p
(1 + r)/K rather than
p
(1 + r).
Solving these equations for M = 20, 16, 12, 9 gives the last four columns of the
table below:
The first numerical column recalls the pure monetary equilibrium without credit
cards from Section 4.1, and the second column recalls the credit card equilibrium
(with no default, i.e. with Hyde absent and τh = 0) from Section 4.2. The third
column describes the CCE with credit card default (Hyde’s defaults τh = .03.) The
remaining columns maintain this credit card default at a constant level, and examine
the effect on CCE of the monetary authority lowering M .
Let us begin by moving from column one to two to three to verify our first three
conclusions.
Observe first that the appearance of Hyde into a world with credit cards engenders
default and reduces total trade τm+τc from .95 to .935., but maintains it higher than
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the .905 it was without credit cards. The wedge between buying and selling is 1+r in
the cash-only economy, is reduced to
√
1 + r by credit cards, but rises to
p
(1 + r)/K
when credit card default occurs. This explains why the volume of trade rises with
credit cards and then falls with default.
The appearance of Hydes, who commit credit card default, is bad for all the honest
Jekylls, though of course the Hydes benefit from their "thefts". Jekyll’s utility rises
slightly from 1.384 without credit cards to 1.386 with credit cards, and then falls all
the way down to 1.370 with credit card default. The reason is that even without credit
cards, the pure monetary equilibrium was close to Pareto efficient. The introduction
of credit cards substantially raised the volume of trade, but since most of these trades
were only minor welfare improvements, it had only a second order effect on increasing
the utility of the Jekylls. The introduction of credit card default reduces the volume
of trade, which again has a minor effect on utility, but it allows the Hydes to steal
from the Jekylls, and this has a first order effect on the Jekylls’ utilities. Thus the
loss from thefts outweights the gains from the extra trades made via credit cards,
explaining why Jekyll has lost utility in moving from column one to column three.
Price levels shoot up from 12.16 without credit cards, to 22.56 with credit cards,
and shoot up even more to 23.37 with credit card default. Thus credit card de-
fault accentuates the inflation. There are two reasons. First, the total volume of
trade is reduced when credit card default sets in, as we have seen. Second, the
fraction τm/(τm + τc) of trade on cash markets falls from .4876/.9525 = 51.2% to
.4706./.9346 = 50.4% as credit card defaults rise. With the same money M + m̄
chasing fewer goods on the cash markets, prices must rise.
The shift from cash goods to credit goods, even as credit card deliveries become
less reliable, seems paradoxical. The explanation depends on general equilibrium:
prices and quantities must adjust so that the Jekylls are still indifferent between the
buy-cash/sell-credit and the buy-credit/sell-cash strategies (equation 4 above), and
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at the same time the Jekylls must obtain just enough cash revenue to pay off all




Since credit card prices are even higher than the cash prices, we see that the
introduction of credit cards with default has created an inflation of nearly 100% from
column one to column three.
An alarmed monetary authority is likely to react by cutting the money supply
M . But as we see in columns three through six, this action does not simply undo
the inflation. As prices fall, interest rates r = 2/M rise and total trade τm + τc
declines. By the time M = 12, trade has already fallen to .904, just below its pre-
credit card level of .905. But cash price levels are still grossly inflated at pm = 15.17,
twenty percent above the pre-credit card levels of 12.16, and credit card prices are of
course higher still at 16.97, giving an average price increase of 24%. If the monetary
authority tries to lower prices any further, it will create stagflation, lowering total
trade while prices remain above pre-credit card levels. The stagflation persists all the
way down to M = 9, by which time prices are back to their pre-credit card levels,
but trade is down two and a half percent from .905 to .879. Of course utility for
the Jekylls is dramatically lower at 13.67. Unlike the situation of Section 4.2, where
credit cards created only a touch of stagflation, here they create a robust stagflation
on account of default.
If the original bank interest rate prior to the introduction of credit cards had
been very low, then the trading volume and utility effects of credit cards would have
been miniscule: the original allocation would already have been close to Walrasian
anyway, and the defaults of the Hydes would have had to be very low, otherwisep
(1 + r)/K > 1+r would cause Jekylls to abandon credit cards and trade exclusively
via cash. Nonetheless, if the government was determined not to reduce the volume of
trade below the precredit card levels, it would still have to accept substantial inflation.
Indeed, consider our example but with M = 20 and m̄ = .1, and τh = .002, giving
an interest rate of 0.5% instead of 10%. Then we see that even without credit cards
the volume of trade is 0.995, and very close to Walrasian. The introduction of credit
cards that do not default creates an inflation of about 100%, but increases trade by
just a little to .99975. If the monetary authority tries to cut the money supply all the
way down to M = 9 to bring down prices to their old levels, it will have to reduce
15The appearance of Hydes obviously lowers K. One might mistakenly guess that pc would rise
enough to maintain equality between Kpc and pm. But that would be based on the erroneous
supposition that agents are indifferent between selling against credit cards and against cash. They
are not, because they get the money sooner if they sell against cash. If pc were to rise so high, then
the buy-cash/sell-credit cards strategy would be just as good as before. But with such a big rise in
pc, the buy-credit/sell-cash strategy would be much worse, contradicting the needed indifference of
Jekyll between the two strategies. Instead, prices must adjust so that both strategies decrease in
attractiveness together, which can only happen if the buy-cash/sell-credit strategy also gets worse
and pm/Kpc rises. Since total cash receipts pmτm must continue to be equal to total credit card
deliveries Kpcτc, τm/τc must fall, as claimed.
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trade to .994. If the Fed is unwilling to reduce output below its precredit card level
of .995, it will have to keep M at least 12 and accept at least a 20% inflation.
6 Credit Card Default: A General Model with
Nominal Penalties
We now present a general model of credit card default with nominal penalties, in
which default levels and default rates are determined endogenously in equilibrium.
Households are not obliged to repay their credit card debts, but if they fail they
must suffer a penalty modeled as a disutility rate λ per dollar value of default.16
If the default penalties are high enough, then the model reduces to the preceding
case where default is ruled out by assumption. If the default penalties are too low,
then nobody will repay their credit card debt, and credit cards will cease to be used.
But for intermediate levels of penalties, credit cards will be used even though there
is default. (Having allowed for default on credit cards, we also allow for default on
bank loans, with a corresponding penalty rate λ̃.)
Our first conclusion is that credit card equilibrium exists for all λ > 0, under
the same gains to trade hypothesis γ(e) > m̄/M as was postulated in Theorem 1 for
the model without credit cards.17 Thus credit cards do not endanger the viability of
money, no matter how low the default penalties.
Next we show via an example that the conclusions of the previous section continue
to hold with nominal default penalties. In particular, credit card default leads to a
16In a one-period model, there is no room for more sophisticated penalties in terms of restrictions
on future economic activity.
17The viability of money relies on our assumption that as prices go to infinity, the default penalty
per dollar stays bounded away from 0.
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stagflation if the monetary authority tries to intervene.
We also get a new phenomenon, namely the catastrophic abandonment of credit
cards if the monetary authority reduces M too far. In our previous example, total
defaults were assumed to be independent of M. Now we find that if M is reduced,
prices fall, so defaulting by a dollar enables one to buy more goods while suffering
the same old penalty λ. Default rates rise rapidly and eventually honest people are
led to shun credit cards altogether.
6.1 Notation
We permit, but do not require, credit limits on cardholders, which presumably reflect
their credit history and estimates of their income/wealth. This bounds the dam-
age unreliable types can do to the average delivery rate. We model these limits as
exogenous.
At the end of the section we vary the model to allow for netting (though at the
present time this is not observed in practice). In order for credit card equilibrium to
exist with netting, it now becomes necessary to require that that there are households
with finite credit limits, or else that there are some "cash-only" commodities in the
economy which cannot be purchased with credit cards.18 Were all commodities liable
to unlimited credit card purchase, money would lose value with unlimited netting,
and ME would cease to exist.
Let us turn to a precise formulation of the model. Let
L1 = the set of cash-only commodities (L1 could be empty).
L2 = L\L1 = the set of commodities accessible to credit cards, as well as money.
For ∈ L2, let
p c ≡ credit card price of
and, for ∈ L, let
p m ≡ cash price of .
Thus market prices are now given by a vector (p, r) ≡ ((p m) ∈L, (p c) ∈L2, r) with
L+L2+1 components. In addition to (p, r), an ME will now have another “macrovari-
able” by way of a scalar 0 ≤ K ≤ 1, where
K ≡ the expected rate of delivery on the credit card.
Before describing the budget-set we introduce (Ch, λh, λ̃h) ∈ R+×R++×R++ for
h ∈ H, where R+ ≡ R+ ∪ {∞}, R++ ≡ R++ ∪ {∞} and
Ch ≡ h’s spending limit on the credit card
λh ≡ h’s penalty rate for default on credit card loans
λ̃h ≡ h’s penalty rate for default on bank loans.
(For simplicity, all three are scalars. We could in general let them be continuous
functions which depend on (p, r,K), the volume of trade, and other macrovariables
of the economy. This would leave our analysis intact.)
18Think of cab rides in Manhattan or street vendors in Mumbai.
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We denote the credit card economy by (E , C, λ, λ̃,m,M,L1).
Note that the penalty rates (λh, λ̃h) may or may not be infinite, but must be
strictly positive. Also note that we allow L1 = ∅ and Ch = ∞. When we introduce
netting, we will be forced to require either L1 6= ∅ or some Ch <∞.
6.2 Budget Set without Netting
The vector qh of market actions of household h now has19 2L+ 2L2 +1 components,
with
qhαβ ≡ quantity of α sent by h to the market αβ
where the markets are nm (the bank loanmarket), ( c) ∈L2 (the credit card-commodity
markets), ( m) ∈L (the cash-commodity markets). In addition to qh, household h
needs also to choose
δh ≡ money repaid on credit card
δ̃h ≡ money repaid on bank loan.








qhm ≤ mh + m̃h (20)X
∈L2
qhc ≤ Ch (30)
qhc + q
h









, with qhc ≡ 0 for ∈ L1 (50 )














xh ≤ ∆(40 ) + x̃h(m) + x̃h(c) (80 )
The budget set Bh(p, r,K) of household h consists of all (qh, δh, δ̃h, xh) that satisfy
constraints (10) to (80). These conditions are exactly as before, except for (30), which
describes the credit limit, and (60) and (70) which say that deliveries must be made
out of the money on hand and that credit card deliveries are due before bank loans.
19Since bank deposits are returned after clearing debts on the credit card, once again no household
will need to deposit money at the bank, and we suppress deposits.
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6.3 Payoffs






nm on his credit card and bank loan
respectively. Therefore his total payoff, including default penalties, is







− λ̃hmax{0, qhnm − δ̃h}.
6.4 Credit Card Equilibrium without Netting
Unrefined Credit Card Equilibrium We say that hp, r,K, (qh, δh, δ̃h, xh)h∈Hi is
an unrefined CCE of the economy ((uh, eh,mh, Ch, λh, λ̃h)h∈H ,M,L1) if:
(i) (qh, δh, δ̃h, xh) ∈ Bh(p, r,K) and Πh(qh, δh, δ̃h, xh) ≥ Πh(qh, δh, δ̃h, xh) for all
(qh, δh, δ̃
h
, xh) ∈ Bh(p, r,K)
















c for ∈ L2 ≡ L\L1










qhc if the denominator is positive
arbitrary, otherwise.
In equilibrium a seller charges p c to any customer who wishes to purchase com-
modity with the credit card. The seller only expects to receive Kp c from the credit
card company. In fact (1−K) is the average rate of default of credit card users. But
the seller need not know this. To him the (1−K) appears as a “user tax” levied by
the credit card company, which guarantees the seller full delivery (net of the tax) on
all credit card purchases. In this interpretation of equilibrium, competition between
potential credit card companies would drive their profits to zero, forcing the equality
of the user tax and the endogenous default rate 1−K.
As it stands there is a problem with our definition. Nothing prevents the expecta-
tion K from being absurdly pessimistic when there is no activity on the credit cards
(since we allow K to be arbitrary in this case). But then this pessimism in turn
ensures that the inactivity will be justified.
Indeed consider an ME without the credit card markets, with prices (p m) ∈L.
Now set the prices (p c) ∈L2 much higher. No household will wish to make credit
card purchases because then he would be obliged to clear his debts on the credit
card by selling relatively huge amounts of other goods at the prices (p m) ∈L in the
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cash-commodity markets; or else undertake to pay a large penalty according to λh.
Hence the demand will be zero on the { c} ∈L2 markets. Now suppose that K is set
(positive but) with Kmax ∈L2{p c} close to zero. Then in spite of the high prices
p c, no household will wish to sell on the { c} ∈L2 markets because he expects almost
no money in return. So the supply will also be zero, and we will have created an
unrefined CCE with no activity on the credit cards. To eliminate these spurious
equilibria, we introduce an equilibrium refinement.
6.4.1 An Equilibrium Refinement
We rule out arbitrary inactivity on the credit card market by adding one more condi-
tion to our definition of equilibrium. An unrefined CCE will be called a CCE if: for all
small ε > 0, there exists an “active, optimistic ε-equilibrium” which is “ε-close” to the
unrefined CCE. An "optimistic ε-equilibrium" is an equilibrium in which all agents
optimize as before, but where we add an external dummy, who puts up 0 < εαβ ≤ ε
of α on every αβ market and who fully redeems all his debts. It is "active" if for
every commodity ∈ L2, there is a real agent who sells positive quantities of against
credit cards.
Note that the dummy never defaults, so if K < 1, there must be real agents
making positive credit card purchases along the sequence at every ε. However, in the
limit at the CCE itself, it may well happen that there is no active trade in the credit
card markets even though credit cards are priced via pc and K.
6.5 Existence of CCE
For simplicity we shall from now on maintain the assumption that utilities are smooth.
Let ∆ be the least upper bound on marginal rates of substitution of commodities











: h ∈ H; , k ∈ L; x ≡ (xh)h∈H ∈ A
¾
where ∇h(xh) = ∂uh(xh)
∂x
. Throughout Section 6 we assume:
∆ <∞.
Theorem 6 Let (E , C, λ, λ̃,m,M) be a credit card economy with γ(e) > m̄/M , and
(recall) with 0 < λ, λ̃ ≤ ∞. Then a CCE exists.
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6.6 Efficiency of Credit Card Equilibrium with Default
It should be no surprise that default reduces the efficiency of trade. IfK < 1, because
some unreliable party is buying and then defaulting on his credit card, a seller will
require a higher price to be induced to give up his goods. A reliable buyer who has
every intention of repaying his credit card will then be discouraged from purchasing.
He must pay more than the seller receives, and this wedge between buying and selling
prices accounts for the reduction in trading efficiency.
If the reliable buyer himself thinks to make life easier by partially defaulting, the
inefficiency argument is unchanged. As long as he delivers something, we can treat
his marginal action as if he fully delivered, and we are back to where we were before.
It is as if he is a split personality: the reliable Dr. Jekyll fully delivers while the
unreliable Mr Hyde fully defaults. The following theorem relies on the hypothesis
that everyone delivers at least something on his credit card debts.
We define a CCE to be interior if every agent makes positive deliveries on both
his credit card and bank loans, and furthermore, buys (or sells) a commodity via cash
if and only if he also buys (or sells) the same commodity via credit card. We also
require that credit limits are not binding. In symbols, we must have for all h ∈ H
xh >> 0
δh > 0, δ̃h > 0
qhm > 0⇐⇒ qhc > 0




Theorem 7: Let hp, r,K, (qh, δh, δ̃h, xh)h∈Hi be an interior CCE of a credit card
economy (E , C, λ, λ̃,m,M,L1 = ∅) without netting. Then


















denotes the average delivery rate on bank loans.
According to Theorem 7, as long as equilibrium is interior, lowering default penal-
ties λ and λ̃ will lower delivery rates K and K̃, and thus increase the gains to trade
γ((xh)h∈H) left at the final allocation. The efficiency of trade declines.
But there is a limit of r on the inefficiency. In general r is endogenous but, if the
λ̃h are all sufficiently high, there will be no default on bank loans, so that K̃ = 1 and
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r = m̄/M, and the gains to trade γ((xh)h∈H) left at the CCE will be at most m̄/M .
Thus even with default, the efficiency of trade with credit cards must be at least as
good as the efficiency of trade without credit cards.
The formula for γ((xh)h∈H) given by Theorem 7 implies that efficiency is steadily
deteriorating as K falls. Since there is a limit on the fall, there has to come a
catastrophic point at which households will abruptly cease using credit cards and
there will be no interior CCE.
6.7 Stagflation with Credit Card Default
Suppose that the bank penalties λ̃h are fixed and high enough to eliminate bank de-
fault. As the credit card penalties λh are lowered from infinity, credit card default will
eventually set in. We illustrate, in the following example, the main effects discussed
earlier. As λ falls: (i) defaults rise; (ii) the total quantity of trade falls; (iii) the
fraction of trade conducted via credit cards rises; (iv) price levels rise; (v) stagflation
emerges; (vi) a threshhold λ∗ is reached below which credit cards are abruptly aban-
doned and the economy reverts to a pre-credit card, pure cash monetary equilibrium.
6.7.1 An Example
Consider our example of Section 4.2, with no Jekylls or Hydes, but with agents who
only repay credit card debt because of the penalty λ. We allow for default on credit
cards by taking λ sufficiently small, but we maintain the assumption that nobody
defaults on bank loans by setting λ̃ sufficiently large.
Symmetry considerations will again allow us to quickly compute equilibrium. Let
τm (τc) be the quantity of each good traded on the cash market (credit card market).









(1 + τm + τc)
= λpc
1










The first equation comes from the fact that all the money is spent in the cash markets.
The second comes from the fact that all the money a household obtains from sales in
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the cash market is used to pay off his credit card dues. The third equation says that a
household is indifferent between buying another unit via the credit card and defaulting
completely on this incremental purchase. The fourth says that he is indifferent to
selling an incremental unit in the cash market and using the proceeds to reduce his
credit card default.
The fifth equation is as before, and makes the Dr. Jekyll side of each agent
indifferent between the buy-cash/sell-credit and buy-credit/sell-cash strategies. The
sixth equation holds because there is no bank default.
With M = 20 and mh = 1 (so m̄ = 2), we have r = 2/20 = 0.1. With λ ≥
0.02165 we get the no-default equilibrium of section 4.2. Below we give a short table
of equilibrium values as λ falls below 0.0216. Notice that there is no credit card
default in the first numerical column, and that credit cards are not used in the last
two columns. Indeed, credit cards will only be used when the "credit card wedge"p
(1 + r)/K =
p
1.1/K between buying and selling does not exceed the "cash wedge"
1 + r = 1.1.
M...... 20.000 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.000 20.0000 20.00
λ .02165 .0210 .0205 .02 .01965
K 1 .971 .948 .926 .910p
1.1/K 1.049 1.065 1.077 1.09 1.1
pm 22.56 23.09 23.52 23.97 24.30
pc 23.66 24.58 25.33 26.12 26.71
τm .488 .476 .468 .459 .453
τc .465 .461 .458 .455 .452

















netutility 1.386 1.378 1.373 1.367 1.3627 1.3840 1.3840
Default Penalty Stagflation Consider the effects of lowering the default penalties
from 0.02165, where default was prohibitively painful and so did not occur (K = 1),
down to 0.01965 at which point K = .910.
The drop in default penalties λ causes an increase in default, and thus a decrease in
delivery ratesK, confirming (i) above. This increases the wedge pc/pm =
p
(1 + r)/K
and reduces the level of real trade τm + τc, confirming (ii).










which shows why τc/τm is rising, confirming (iii).
Cash prices pm rise as the same total money M + m̄ chases fewer goods 2τm,
confirming (iv).
Net utilities fall for three reasons: trade diminishes on account of increases in the
wedge; the total default penalty λ(pcτc − pmτm) increases because default increases
35
more than λ falls; the purchasing power of the initial cash endowments of outside
money mh falls since cash prices pm rise.
The reduction in default penalty rates λ thus causes a stagflation: prices go up,
and output (trade) and utilities go down, confirming (v).
We study (vi) in the next section.
The catastrophic elimination of credit cards Once K falls to .910, it is no
longer disadvantageous to trade exclusively on the cash market, as compared to buy-
ing with a credit card and selling for cash or vice versa. This is reflected in the fact
that the wedge pc/pm =
p
(1 + r)/K =
p
1.1/.910 = 1.1 = 1 + r has risen to the
gross bank interest rate of 1.1. Any further reduction in the penalty λ will increase
the wedge still further and cause households to abandon credit cards altogether, as
we see in the last column where λ = .01 and tc = 0.
At the point where λ = .01965, there are actually two equilibria, with identical
real trade but very different prices (and different utilities). The first (described by the
fifth numerical column) involves the use of both cash and credit cards, and the second
(shown in the sixth numerical column) is cash only. The first equilibrium is obtained
by solving the same equations as in 6.7.1. But in the second equilibrium credit cards
have been abandoned in favor of cash. This is so because, with low delivery rates K,
credit card prices pc are so high that credit card purchases become unattractive to
the Dr. Jekylls who intend to keep their promises
pc/pm = 1/K = 1/.455 >
p
(1 + r)/K =
p
1.1/.455 > 1.1 = 1 + r
and nobody will take credit from the Mr. Hydes. This is the start of a new regime, of
cash-only equilibria. We compute these equilibria from the pure monetary equilibrium
(described in Section 4.1) as follows. Set τc = 0, then compute pc from the third
equation of 6.7.1, and finally compute K from the equation Kpc = pm. This last
equation holds because, in the trembles of the refinement, sellers must be indifferent to
raising a dollar via cash sales and credit card sales. (That was not true before because
the proceeds from the cash sales were used entirely to pay off credit card debts before
credit card receipts were obtained. In the trembles from cash-only equilibria, most
of the cash receipts are kept around to pay the bank loans). As λ falls further below
the threshhold .01965, we remain in the cash-only regime, with the same transactions
and same cash prices, but ever rising pc and falling K.
It is noteworthy that at the threshhold λ = .01965, there is a catastrophic change
in regime. Credit cards abruptly disappear (taking with them the default penalties),
net utility jumps up, and pm falls dramatically.
Utilitarian stagflation caused by credit cards Supose we are in a pure mon-
etary equilibrium, as in the example from Section 4.1, and then credit cards are
introduced, as in Section 4.2. Suppose, however, that the credit cards do not carry
infinite default penalty rates; for concreteness, suppose the penalty rate is λ = .02.
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In the new equilibrium that emerges, cash prices pm nearly double, from 12.16 to
23.97, while net utility falls from 1.384 to 1.367. There is, to be sure, a slight increase
in trade which goes up from .905 to 914. The utility gains from the extra trade are,
however, more than offset by the default penalties that households incur.
Recall that there are two negative effects of credit cards on household utilities.
The first is that the higher inflation reduces the purchasing power of their money
endowments. The second is the deadweight loss of utility when they default. The
benefit is a lower wedge between buying and selling. When default penalties are so
high as to prevent default, as in the first numerical column, the reduction in the
wedge (from (1 + r) = 1.1 to
p
(1 + r) = 1.049) is significant enough to offset the
disadvantages of credit cards. But with default, the wedge is improved less, from
(1 + r) = 1.1 to
p
(1 + r)/K = 1.09, and so we see a net loss in welfare in the
transition from the pure monetary economy to credit cards. Indeed this is true in all
the numerical columns 2 till 5.
Thus the introduction of credit cards with default dramatically raises prices and
simultaneously lowers utilities.
Stagflation caused by the reaction of monetary policy to credit cards Sup-
pose now that the monetary authority is alarmed by the nearly 100% increase in price
levels, from 12.16 to 23.97, caused by the introduction of credit cards (with penalty
rates .02). If the monetary authority reacts to the terrible inflation by gradually
shrinking the money supply from M = 20 to M = 19.57, then we get a new equilib-
rium shown below in the fourth column. Prices do decline slightly to 23.85, but at































Compared to the pre-credit card, pure monetary equilibrium levels (shown in the far
left column), the monetary authority has engineered not merely utilitarian stagfla-
tion, but the full-blown stagflation of (much) higher prices (from 12.16 to 23.85) and
(slightly lower) trade/output (from .905 to .904).
If the monetary authority tries to further reduce prices by shrinkingM still more,
it will quickly drive out credit cards altogether. When M = 19.5, credit cards have
already been driven out, as shown in the last column. At this point prices are restored
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to slightly less than the pre-credit card level of 12.16, because M is smaller. But
output is also smaller.
The upshot is that in order to undo the inflationary effects of credit cards, it is
necessary to tighten money supply M so much as to banish credit cards altogether.
But this entails reducing output/trade to below its pre-credit card levels, since there
is now less money and higher interest rates, and no credit cards in use.
6.8 Real Default Penalties
Penalties so far have been based on the dollar value of the default. They could instead
be indexed by a basket of goods, so that in times of high inflation they do not become
astronomically harsh. For instance, suppose an agent has additively separable utility
u(x) =
PL
=1 u (x ) and suppose the penalty for each dollar’s worth of default is
λ/pLc. Then if the agent is defaulting in equilibrium, his consumption of good L is
fixed by ∂uL(xL)/∂xL = λ. The Hydes in our example of Section 5 could have been
generated via real penalties with an appropriately chosen λ, as could the Jekylls for
whom we could imagine λ =∞.
6.9 Postscript: Credit Card Equilibrium with Netting
It is imaginable that in some future era, electronic accounting will enable credit card
accounts to be netted, so that a household that runs a business will be able to subtract
its outstanding credit card payables from its own credit card debt. This turns out to
make equilibrium more problematic, but we show it still does exist if there are credit
card limits or cash-only commodities. Here we outline the details.
The budget set is exactly as before, except that we replace (60), (70) with











When netting is permitted, we need to strengthen the gains-to-trade hypothesis
somewhat in order to guarantee the existence of credit card equilibrium..
Define the set H∗ of households who have credit limits, i.e.,
H∗ = {h ∈ H : Ch <∞}.
Define A to be the allocations in which no household trades cash-only commodi-
ties, and no credit-constrained household trades, i.e., A = {x ≡ (xh)h∈H ∈ A : xh =
eh for h ∈ H, ∈ L1; and xh = eh for h ∈ H∗}
Strengthened Intratemporal Gains to Trade Hypothesis For all x ∈ A,
γ(x) > m̄/M
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Theorem 8 Consider an economy (E , C, λ, λ̃,m,M,L1) with m̄ > 0. Suppose the
strengthened intratemporal gains-to-trade hypotheses holds. Then a credit card mon-
etary equilibrium, with netting permitted, exists.
Theorem 8 says that if there are cash-only commodities (not accessible to credit
cards), or if there are households with credit limits, then money can still have value
even when netting is permitted on credit cards. But as the number of such com-
modities and households is diminished, it becomes more difficult to sustain the value
of money, since the set A expands and the strengthened gains-to-trade hypothesis is
rendered progressively more demanding.
For sufficiently high values of λ, λ̃ there is no default in an ME. This is because
the presence of outside money puts a lower bound on cash prices p m (otherwise any
h with mh > 0 could acquire arbitrary amounts of goods, a contradiction). Since
p c ≥ p m as we already saw, all prices have a lower bound. Thus there is a cap on the
“utiles” that a dollar (borrowed from the credit card company, or the bank) can buy;
and, once the λ or λ̃ are higher than this cap, defaults will simply not be worthwhile
for any household to undertake at any monetary equilibrium.
Finally we note that if L1 and H∗ are both empty then no ME exists, i.e., money
loses all value. Of course, in this scenario, Walras equilibria are achieved as pure
credit card equilibria, with netting.
7 Proofs
7.1 Proof of Theorem 4
For the proof, we first show














































































Proof of Theorem 4 We begin with a pure monetary equilibrium (p∗, r∗, (∗qh,∗ xh)h∈H)
of (E ,m,M∗). (By Theorem 1, such an equilibrium must exist). From this we con-







p c=(1 + r
∗)p∗m.
These are the market prices for our candidate credit card equilibrium. We shall
start by showing that these prices give any household h exactly the same trading
opportunities Bhc (p, r) in the credit card economy as he enjoyed via B
h(p∗, r∗) in the
pure monetary economy.
Observe that by Theorem 1, r∗ = m̄/M∗, since r∗ is the equilibrium interest rate
of the monetary economy (E ,m,M∗). Hence, by the lemma, and the definition of r,




In the purely monetary equilibrium, with prices (p∗, r∗), a household can only
purchase commodities via cash, either out of his endowment or after borrowing the
money. In the latter case, he must raise the money to repay the bank by a contem-
poraneous sale of (1 + r∗) dollar’s worth of other goods for each dollar borrowed.
In the candidate credit card equilibrium, any household can spend its endowment
of money in precisely the same way, on the cash commodity markets, since p m = p∗m.
But buying on credit in the credit card economy is slightly more complicated. A
household has the option, as in the pure monetary economy, of borrowing a dollar
from the bank and then spending it on goods, while simultaneously selling (1 + r)
dollars of goods to defray the bank loan at the end. However, this option is very bad,
since r > r∗. There are two other ways of buying on credit, which equally achieve the
more efficient transactions tax of r∗. He can sell for cash and buy k with a credit
card, or he can sell against a credit card and buy k with cash.
In the first way, let h sell (1 + r∗)/p m units of good for cash. Let him simulta-
neously buy (1 + r∗)/pkc units of k with his credit card. Since pkc = (1 + r∗)p∗km, he
is purchasing the equivalent of one dollar’s worth of good k (at the prices p∗km) while
selling 1 + r∗ dollar’s worth of good (at the prices p∗m = p m).
Alternatively, let h sell (1+r)/p c units of good on the credit card market, while
simultaneously buying 1/pkm units of k with a dollar borrowed from the bank. Since
the bank interest rate is r, the sale defrays the debt incurred by the purchase. Once
again the household is buying a dollar’s worth of good k (at prices p∗km = pkm) while
selling 1+r∗ dollar’s worth of good (at prices p∗m = [1/(1+r
∗)]p c = (1/
√











Hence a household will never buy a unit of k at the kc market and deliver on this
promise via borrowed (and hoarded) bank money. For in this case he borrows pkc
dollars to obtain one unit of k at kc, whereas he would have done better to spend
the money instead at the km market buying pkc/pkm =
√
1 + r units of k. Moreover,
each household will spend all its (owned or borrowed) money at the cheaper-priced
( m) ∈L markets rather than the ( c) ∈L markets.
Next note that any household who spends borrowed money at the ( m) ∈L markets
will choose to repay the loan via sales at the higher-priced ( c) ∈L markets, rather than
at the ( m) ∈L markets. On the other hand, sellers at cash-commodity markets will
always use all the cash from their sales to make deliveries on credit card purchases.
(Since the cash can be so used, and pkc =
√
1 + rpkm < (1 + r)pkm for all k ∈ L, it
would be clearly inoptimal to borrow money at interest r to purchase at the ( m) ∈L
markets against this cash).
This concludes our demonstration that the opportunity set in the credit card
economy with prices (p, r) is the same for each household as in the pure monetary
economy with prices (p∗, r∗). All that remains is to display budget feasible actions
(qh, xh)h∈H with xh = ∗xh, for each h ∈ H, such that all markets clear. We shall give
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an infinite recursion whose limit defines these actions.
The recursion begins by making households spend their money endowments in the
L cash markets, in the same proportion as their expenditures in the pure monetary
equilibrium. Dividing total expenditure on each commodity by the price p m = p∗m
gives a "demand" for each commodity . In general, in any round t we begin with
an incremental demand for goods in the cash market. We construct a matching
supply (out of goods households would have sold in the ∗-monetary equilibrium, but
have not yet sold). These sales generate income against which the households can
charge expenditures on their credit cards in round t. Again we construct a matching
supply in the credit card markets out of goods households would have sold at the
∗-monetary equilibrium. These sales in the credit market in round t generate income
which support the demand for expenditures of 1/(1+ r) the value of sales revenue in
the credit card market in the cash market at t+ 1. The recursion then continues.
The key idea is that each round replicates a piece of the trading in the ∗-monetary
equilibrium. At the end of each round t, markets clear and every household has
exactly financed its credit card purchases with contemporaneous cash sales, and is
carrying credit card receivables from that round which will be used to cover exactly
the principal and interest on the cash expenditures it will make in round t+ 1. The
process must converge because the aggregate cash revenue generated in period t+ 1
is always (1/1 + r) (the aggregate cash revenue generated in period t).





denote the fraction of his expenditures agent h devoted to commodity in the ∗-
monetary equilibrium.
Begin the recursion by making each agent h spend all his cash endowment mh
on the cash markets, in the same proportion as his expenditures in the ∗-monetary
economy. Formally, define
qhm (1) ≡ βhmh for all ∈ L, all h ∈ H.







as the demand for goods created by the expenditures in round (1). If Q m(1) = 0,








Note that qhm(1) ≤ ∗qhm, and that supply equals demand for each good.
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We now proceed to the credit card market. The sales of goods just constructed in
the cash market give the sellers income against which to make credit card purchases.
Define













be the demand for goods in the credit card market, created by the expenditures in








Note that supply equals demand in the credit market in round (1).








c(t))h∈H , Q m(t), Q c(t)) ∈L
have been generated for t = 1, ..., T . We now define the same vector for t = T + 1.
Define







kc(T ) for all and h
and
qhnm(T + 1) ≡ (1 + r)
LX
=1
qhm (T + 1).
Let






be the total demand for goods in the cash market in round T +1. If Q m(T +1) = 0,
set qhm(T + 1) = 0 for all h ∈ H.
Otherwise, define
qhm(T + 1) ≡





















These supplies in the cash market at T + 1 generate the income for purchases in
the credit card market at T + 1. Define














qhc (T + 1)
be the demand for goods in the credit card market in round T +1. If Q c(T +1) = 0,
set qhc(T + 1) = 0 for all h ∈ H.
Otherwise, define
qhc(T + 1) ≡



































− qhm − qhc for all h, .
Recall that we assume m̄ > 0, hence r = m̄/M > 0. By monotonicity, we know
p∗m > 0 for all ∈ L. By construction, the value of aggregate purchases in the cash
market at round 1 is m̄ > 0. This generates aggregate (matching) sales of value
m̄. These sales call forth credit card purchases of aggregate value m̄ in round 1,
again generating matching sales of aggregate value m̄. In round 2, aggregate bank
promises must be m̄, so aggregate expenditures are only m̄/(1 + r). Thus aggregate
expenditures for cash and credit in any period t must be 2m̄/(1 + r)t−1, split equally
between cash and credit.
This sum converges, and dominates the sales and purchases of each individual.










= 2(M + m̄),
since rM = m̄. HenceM+m̄ is spent for cash purchases, andM+m̄ is spent for credit
card purchases. But credit card prices p c = (1 + r∗)p m = (1 + r∗)p∗m. Consider the
revenue generated by each sale (whether in the cash market or the credit card market)





>From our lemma, this is equal to
M∗ + m̄.
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Since supply equals demand by construction, total expenditures (evaluated at prices
p∗) must also be M∗ + m̄. But also by construction, each agent is always making
trades which would balance his budget at p∗ in the monetary economy, without every


























It is straightforward to verify that we have defined a pure monetary equilibrium.
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7.2 Proof of Theorems 6 and 8
We shall prove Theorems 6 and 8 simultaneously, indicating what modifications need
to be made if netting is allowed as in Theorem 8.
If Ch = 0 ∀h ∈ H, then Theorems 6 and 8 are identical to the no credit card
theorem, i.e., to Theorem 1. Hence we suppose some Ch > 0.
For any > 0, we shall define a generalized game Γ with a finite-type continuum
player set. Replace each h ∈ H by a continuum of identical players t ∈ (h−1, h] (i.e.,
et ≡ eh, ut ≡ uh, Ct ≡ Ch, λt ≡ λh, λ̃t ≡ λ̃h for t ∈ (h − 1, h]). Given an integrable
choice of market actions qαβ : (0,H]→ R+ and qβα : (0, H]→ R+ at the market αβ,
the price pαβ( ) is formed in Γ simply as the ratio of aggregate β to aggregate α.












except on the credit card/commodity markets,where it puts up only 2 by way of
commodity sales, so that









The 2 ensures that if the external dummy is the sole seller of commodies on the
c market, then p c( ) → ∞ as → 0. Furthermore, we suppose that the external
dummy fully delivers on his credit card promises (thus creating |L2| units of money












The set of feasible actions of any player depends on others’ actions only via the pαβ( )
and K( ), and is defined exactly as in (10) till (80), except that we impose an upper
bound of 1/ on all actions of the players in Γ . Payoffs are defined exactly as before
(with or without netting). This completely specifies the generalized game Γ .
By an ε-ME, we shall mean a type-symmetric Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies)










tdt, respectively, at an -ME.)20
Consider a subsequence of ε-ME as ε→ 0 in which all quantities, as well as their
ratios, are converging (possibly to infinity or zero).
20The symbols qhαβ, δ
h will refer equally to aggregate or individual actions. The meaning will
always be clear from the context.
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For small ε, the external dummy is creating less than 1 unit of goods or money.
Letting M̃ =M+m̄+1, any household h will end up with utility at most uh((1, ..., 1)+P
i∈H e




c (ε)− M̃). We shall often use the fact that
since utilities are concave and strictly increasing, we may assume without loss of
generality that uh(x)→∞ as xk →∞ for any component k, as explained in Dubey-
Geanakoplos (2003a).
We can see from the above upper bound on utility that the bonds promised to the
bank (qhnm(ε)) will be bounded in spite of the possibility of default, since otherwise
h would have done better not trading and obtaining utility uh(eh). Similarly qhc (ε)
will be bounded when there is no netting. It is obvious that cash expenditures qhm
cannot exceed the total cash on hand, which is bounded by M̃ , and commodity sales
qhm, q
h
c cannot exceed the endowments e
h. Hence all quantities have finite limits.
Clearly the gross interest rate (1 + r(ε)) cannot fall below 1 in any ε − ME,
otherwise agents in the tremble would borrow infinitely, spend the fraction −r(ε) on
goods, obtaining arbitrarily large utility, and still repay the bank, contradicing the
upper bound on utility given above. The interest rate must also stay bounded above,
on account of the boundedness of qhnm(ε).
All prices p m(ε) stay bounded away from zero, for otherwise any agent with
mh > 0 could buy arbitrarily large amounts of good contradicting the upper bound





k}/p c(ε) → ∞ of good with his credit card, and repay the
credit card from the receipts from the sales of his endowment on the cash markets,
again contradicting the upper bound on utility.
Suppose some price ratio p m(ε)/pkx(ε)→∞ (where x = m or c) as ε→ 0. Then
any household h with eh > 0 can sell eh for cash p m(ε)eh, borrow p m(ε)eh/(1+ r(ε))
dollars, and buy p m(ε)eh/[(1+r(ε))pkx(ε)]→∞ of commodity k. If x = m, the agent
buys with the borrowed money, and defrays the bank loan from the sales of eh. If
x = c, the agent repays his credit card purchase with the borrowed bank money and
later defrays the bank loan with the proceeds of the sale of eh. Then, for sufficiently
small , the agent will achieve utility exceeding the upper bound, a contradiction.
Hence if any cash price goes to infinity, so do all prices.
Next observe that if a credit card price p c(ε)→∞ then for small ε no buyer on
that market will default, since he gets virtually no goods for his dollar but pays a
significant penalty λ. Since the external dummy always keeps his promises, K(ε) = 1.
But now precisely the same argument given in the previous paragraph shows that all
prices must go to infinity.
To sum up, if any price goes to infinity, so do all prices.
We shall now show that prices do not go to infinity. Suppose they do. Then all
sales of commodities on cash markets or credit card markets must go to zero, since
we have shown that expenditures are bounded above. That implies final consumption
converges to the initial endowments. Without netting, this contradicts the gains to
trade hypothesis (as explained in Dubey-Geanakoplos 2003a). If there is netting,
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then we contradict the strengthened gains to trade hypothesis.
It is easy to check that the requirements of refinement are met. Observe that
since prices do not go to infinity, for each there exists some seller h with qhc(ε) > 0,
for otherwise p c(ε) ≥ ε/ε2 → ∞. (By the way, if K(ε) < 1, then since the external
agent always redeems his debts, there must be some buyer who is defaulting, that is
some h and commodity with qhc (ε) > 0.)¥
7.3 Proof of Theorem 7
Define a reallocation cycle cn as a sequence of distinct commodities ( 1, ..., n) and
households (h1, ..., hn). By Theorem 1 in Dubey-Geanakoplos (2003a),














where the second max is taken over the finite set Cn of all reallocation cycles of length
n.
In view of this formula, the first equality will follow if we can show that the
product is at most
q
(1 + m̄/M)/KK̃ for every cycle, and exactly that high for at
least one cycle.
Since the CCE is interior, there exists a cycle c∗ in which hi is selling i against
both cash and credit card, and is also buying i+1 against both cash and credit card.
To buy units more (or less) of i+1 with cash obtained from a bank loan, hi must
sell (1 + r)p
i+1m/Kp ic units more (or less) of i on the credit card market in order










(If h were not buying i+1 or not selling i then we would have the LHS ≤ RHS).
Similarly, to buy units more (or less) of i+1 with his credit card, hi must sell
p











(If h were not buying i+1 or not selling i then we would have the LHS ≤ RHS).
Multiplying the corresponding sides of these two displays and rearranging terms















Since no one will hold worthless cash at the end, all the money in the system will
be delivered to the bank, i.e.
P




nm) =M + m̄. From the













for every hi in the cycle c∗. The nth root of the product of these RHS over all n





So we have produced one cycle that meets the bound. Every other cycle must do
the same or worse, since, as we have noted, there would then be inequalities and not
equalities.






= 1 + r. It remains to argue the last inequality. Clearly
Kp ic ≥ p im
otherwise hi would not sell i on the ic market (it is strictly better for him to transfer
the sale to the im market). Hence, from the second display, we get
∂uhi
∂x i+1















} 1n ≤ 1 + r.
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